

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.109  
15 MARCH 1963

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday 15 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. KURKA

(Czechoslovakia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.M. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. R.L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. C. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. RUSHCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GOBTER  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and ninth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): On 13 March the Committee heard a statement by the United States delegation the importance and value of which will, I hope, have escaped no one. Mr. Stelle gave us a clear and detailed account of what in the United States delegation's opinion should be the procedure governing inspection (ENDC/PV.108, pp. 5 et seq.). We now have before us a complete American blue-print for a treaty on the prohibition of tests. We have a good basis upon which to establish fruitful co-operation; but all delegations remain free to make observations and to formulate their own proposals.

On the other hand, we have unfortunately so far had no Soviet blueprint for a treaty. From the Soviet side we have heard only an insistently repeated number, the acceptance of which is presented as an ultimatum. We are told "Accept this figure, or we shall not allow you to negotiate on anything". That is a system of negotiation which I deeply deplore. I find the statements made by Mr. Tsarapkin at our 108th meeting totally incomprehensible. Mr. Tsarapkin told us that the United States delegation, in presenting proposals and defining clearly its ideas on the methods of inspection, was trying to torpedo the Committee's work (ibid., p.33 ).

I may say that, as far as I am concerned, I have made without success every possible effort to understand the Soviet attitude, which is contrary to all normal methods of negotiation and appears even to be in contradiction with the repeatedly-asserted Soviet desire to reach an agreement. I should like to be sure that there are no ulterior motives behind this attitude. At our recent meetings the delegations of the socialist countries have insisted so often that inspections are unnecessary, and that in their opinion doubtful phenomena do not exist, that we cannot help entertaining some suspicions. I should not like inspections to be considered by the Soviet delegation merely as an inconvenient formality which should consequently be reduced to a minimum or even to a symbolical gesture. That

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is an assumption which I do not wish to make. The letters which Mr. Khrushchev has written to Mr. Kennedy (ENDC/73) are to my mind clear and binding. When these letters speak of inspections, they surely mean inspections which are efficient and valid for the aims to which they are directed; but if there remains any doubt on this point, it should be removed.

All that my delegation asks of the Soviet delegation is that it should explain the meaning of the word "inspection" as used in Mr. Khrushchev's letter, and that it should develop the concept indicated there. We know now what the United States delegation means by an inspection. What is the Soviet delegation's reply, what are its proposals? We should like the Soviet delegation to emerge from this silence, which may well engender doubts as to the sincerity of its intentions. The delegations of the socialist countries often indulge in the barren game of seeking indications of the bad faith of the United States in the free and independent press of the West; but what proofs have we here in the present negotiations of the Soviet Government's spirit of co-operation?

Moreover, the Soviet delegation should not see anything offensive or derogatory in our search for guarantees to attend the application of a test ban treaty, as Mr. Tsarapkin did in his statement on 11 March (ENDC/PV.107, p.34). These guarantees are reciprocal and, even if there was no distrust between us, would be necessary according to the rules of international law. In the present state of international law, all agreements are based upon the principle pacta sunt servanda. If one party violates a treaty, the only recourse for the other party is to consider itself also freed from the treaty. Taking this principle as our basis, it is necessary that neither party should have any doubt concerning the application of the treaty. Both must have means of satisfying themselves in this matter. It is not a question of preconceived or **unfair** distrust. It is a question simply of applying the normal rules of international law.

Hence the request for seven inspections and seven automatic stations is not offensive to anybody. It corresponds simply with the entirely normal requirement that the treaty should provide sufficient guarantees to both parties. This

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requirement has been accepted in principle by everyone, and the modalities of its application are what we must discuss with the participation of all delegations. These modalities -- these parameters, as they are called -- naturally have a technical aspect, and my delegation therefore followed with interest the scientific discussions which took place at our 107th and 108th meetings.

The Italian delegation believes in the usefulness of this kind of discussion; although we should have preferred the exchange of views to be more constructive and capable of providing us with concrete assistance in overcoming our present difficulties. Unfortunately, certain statements by the delegation of the socialist countries were concerned more with the past of our negotiations than with their future, and for this reason were not constructive. Indeed, the delegations of the socialist countries attempted to demonstrate once more, particularly at our 107th meeting, as I said just now, that inspections are unnecessary and that in their opinion there are no doubtful phenomena. These are arguments which have already been contested by the Western delegations at earlier sessions of our Conference, and to my mind it would be superfluous to return to this question.

However, I wish to point out once more that, when technical questions are discussed, it is always on the basis of the scientific data available to the Western nuclear Powers. These data are interpreted in an uncharitable and sometimes tendentious manner by the delegations of the socialist countries. However, these delegations have never adduced their own scientific data in rebuttal. It would seem normal in negotiations of this kind that, when one side provides abundant material for judgement and honestly submits the results of its scientific research for examination by other delegations, the other side in turn should also make known the results of its work. In this connexion we only know the views expressed by the Soviet scientists at the Pugwash Conference, and these views confirm quite clearly the existence of doubtful phenomena and the consequent necessity for on-site inspections (ENDC/66).

I should like very much to know what are the scientific data on which the Soviet proposal for three inspections is based. We know those on which the United States proposal is based, since they have been submitted for examination

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and criticism by our Committee (ENDC/PV.105, pp. 18 et seq.; PV.107, pp. 5 et seq. ENDC/45); but we are completely ignorant of the technical reasons for the Soviet position, and we do not know why this number three cannot be modified. Above all, we should like to know why a number of inspections greater than three would be prejudicial and dangerous for the Soviet Union, and why it is considered unacceptable.

The figure of three automatic stations which has also been laid down as an ultimatum seems to us even less explicable. If I have properly understood the Soviet delegation's idea, automatic stations would act as a double check on national stations. The national stations would be placed under the supervision of automatic stations, and this would prevent the alteration or falsification of the recordings made by the national stations. If such is the Soviet argument, one can only wonder why the automatic stations should be limited to three and should be installed only in seismic regions. The danger that a government might alter the records of national stations exists everywhere, in non-seismic as well as in seismic regions. If the national stations in a non-seismic region were not placed under the supervision of automatic stations, a government acting in bad faith would probably select this region for its clandestine tests.

These are the few brief considerations which the debates at our last few meetings have suggested to me, and I am submitting them to the Committee; not in a controversial spirit, but simply to demonstrate how necessary it is to continue our negotiations in perseverance and goodwill, without neglecting any problem. My delegation is pleased that, in accordance with our co-Chairmen's decision (ENDC/PV.108, p.34), the Committee is keeping the problem of tests in the forefront of its agenda, and that those delegations who wish to do so can continue to examine it. Indeed, I believe that the Committee is waiting impatiently for a fresh contribution from the delegations of the non-aligned States, and that it is hoping that this contribution will enable it to escape from the present deadlock. That at least is the feeling of the Italian delegation.

My delegation remains convinced that the time is propitious for an agreement, and that we must not miss this opportunity, which may not recur later. It considers



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that we must continue our work on tests while dealing with all the other problems involved without exception. . We should like once more to appeal to the Soviet delegation to abandon its rigidity and obstinacy, and to co-operate with the other delegations in seeking an agreement.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The suggestion made jointly by our co-Chairmen at last Wednesday's meeting (ibid.) has prompted me to intervene today in this discussion to make certain observations regarding the problem of nuclear tests before we turn our attention to other matters.

At the meeting last Wednesday we in fact agreed on one point only: to maintain the rule that any delegation may in a plenary meeting, at any time and without previous notice, discuss any subject which it considers appropriate. This rule allows representatives to discuss both nuclear tests and general and complete disarmament. It cannot, in fact, be otherwise; the same rights exist for representatives who prefer to discuss one subject as for those who prefer another subject. We ourselves prefer to deal with tests, and that is what I propose to do today.

The negotiation of a treaty in which different interests and viewpoints have to be reconciled is inevitably a long, slow and difficult task. The negotiation of a treaty with legitimate safeguards to ensure that its operation and effect will not have adverse repercussions on the national security of the contracting parties is still more difficult. The negotiation of a treaty when the sides concerned fear and distrust each other and when a struggle for prestige is involved, when each side attributes to the other secret and malicious intentions, is a task requiring great patience and immense tenacity. Only the clear realization that a fundamental and common interest which transcends all differences is at stake can make persistence in this task possible. Such is the political climate in which we find ourselves, and such are the circumstances in which we are attempting to negotiate an agreement to cease all nuclear weapon tests.

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Two further factors, however, give our task a dramatic significance. One is the urgent necessity to conclude an agreement as quickly as possible; the other is the terrible conviction that, if agreement is not reached, the only alternative is a crime against humanity. There is no other way of interpreting public opinion all over the world regarding the resumption of a full-scale nuclear tests race in all environments and its disastrous consequence.

In negotiating other political treaties, whether peace or frontier treaties, treaties of friendship or commerce, navigation or fishing rights, cultural relations, and even military treaties or defensive alliances, the parties are not faced with such an urgent time factor in which delay in concluding an agreement entails such incalculable dangers. The problem of the cessation of nuclear tests has reached a critical point. It is not on our side, and delay in concluding an agreement brings unspeakable dangers closer every day.

In the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly alone, we have already invoked all possible arguments: morality, justice, self-preservation, the safeguarding of the noblest achievements of man throughout his history, the duty to spare mankind indescribable sufferings, the survival of humanity. Both sides recognize the gravity and the weight of these arguments, and the exchange of letters between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers (ENDC/73) and the President of the United States (ENDC/74) is a proof of this.

We believe that both sides desire an agreement. This desire may be sincere, but it is feeble, weak and incomplete -- a desire subject to so many conditions, premises and provisos that it lacks any creative power. The desire for an agreement exists, but other and stronger desires and circumstances also exist which stifle it. In the name of security, insecurity is increased. In the name of compulsory inspection, all inspection is renounced. In the name of the total suppression of tests, all tests are allowed. As no one is prepared to run the slightest risk, every risk is accepted. There has never been a more apt example of the saying that the best is the enemy of the good. We want everything but we get nothing.

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We have been told many times that the sides have never been so close to an agreement as at present. However, to anyone reading and re-reading the verbatim records and listening to the repetition of the same arguments day after day, it looks as though the agreement is as close and as far as Godot, and that we are like Samuel Beckett's characters waiting for Godot. Whether one is far from or close to an agreement does not matter, if it is not achieved. To stop close to or far from the goal is equally a failure. Only reaching the goal has any value or true significance.

The distance, great or small, which separates the nuclear Powers from agreement does not depend on and is not measured by the difference between the number of inspections which each side proposes. The distance in this case is a question of will, the willingness to negotiate all controversial points. A solution depends on the evaluation which each side makes of, and the importance it attaches to, the urgent settlement of these problems, and the political appraisal, right or wrong, which it makes of the consequences of failure. As long as the Powers do not believe in the danger of continuing nuclear arms explosions and do not fear them, and as long as they are not convinced that failure to reach agreement will make it more difficult to avoid war, they will not be able to take the last and decisive step to meet each other.

We believe that both sides sincerely desire to reach the goal we all have in view, and we are confident that if they want the end they also want the means. The only means is negotiation; but real negotiation is a two-way road, along which both sides must move forward with the aim of meeting and the intention of arriving at a constructive settlement.

In their respective statements, each side often maintains that the other is doing everything possible to prevent an agreement; while at the same time it proclaims its own desire and intention to put an end to the nuclear weapons tests. I do not think that such accusations help us in our task. Any agreement or negotiation is a matter of mutual consent. If each side really believes that the other does not want an agreement, both must recognize that differences regarding the number and kind of inspections are not the real cause of the deadlock. The

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so-called concessions should not be regarded as falling back from one trench-line to another, or as mere incidents in the strategy of attack and defence. Neither side can strengthen its own confidence in the validity of the treaty at the expense of the confidence of the other side.

Sincere and authentic negotiations do not depend on where they take place, nor on the procedure chosen for conducting them. Neither the technique of debate nor the nature of our meetings can solve our problem. The great Powers have resolved much more difficult and urgent problems, such as the Caribbean crisis. The day when the Powers realize that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is as urgent as the Caribbean crisis was then, even though the danger and threat may not be so obvious, on that day we shall conclude a treaty quickly enough.

Debates on general disarmament and on collateral measures are of course important. Those problems, together with that of the cessation of tests, are the object and reason of this Committee's existence. However, whatever value public opinion may place on our task, we members of this Committee must not lose sight of reality and must put first things first. This reality does not depend on us but is determined by the policies of governments, especially those of the great Powers, and it is a reality which unfortunately points in a direction away from general and complete disarmament.

Rearmament plans continue to be elaborated and improved. Some of these extend beyond the period considered necessary to effect general and complete disarmament in all its stages. Military budgets are still increasing, nuclear weapons tests continue, and mutual distrust grows stronger. All these are factors working against the higher objectives assigned to this Conference, objectives which point in a diametrically-opposite direction and which consist in checking the armaments race, putting an end to competition in nuclear weapons, hindering the proliferation of these weapons, elaborating a treaty of general disarmament, reducing the dangers of a war by accident or miscalculation, and concluding collateral agreements which would ease international tension.

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Progress towards the attainment of our objective may be slow and difficult; but if we act outside that framework, or work in a contrary direction, our efforts will be as futile as those of Sisyphus. Two divergent objectives cannot be followed at the same time. International events are the result not of spontaneous generation, but rather of the will or conduct of those who rule and govern. Those events may create favourable conditions for achieving this Conference's aims, which all the governments represented here wish to achieve, and which are shared by all humanity.

Yesterday -- 14 March -- was the Eighteen-Nation Committee's first anniversary. Our task has been arduous, and the delegations represented here have spared no effort to carry out the tasks which have been entrusted to us. The mandate of the General Assembly, which considered the cessation of nuclear weapon tests as the most urgent objective, has still not been implemented, in spite of the satisfactory basis which exists for agreeing on a test ban. Our primary and immediate task is to put a stop to nuclear weapons tests, and we must not allow our attention to be diverted into other channels until this task has been accomplished.

That does not preclude the discussion of the various aspects of general disarmament; quite the contrary. The conclusion of an agreement to cease nuclear tests would be an excellent introduction to the discussion of disarmament. Before fitting a window frame into a wall, you must first build the wall; and before building the wall, you must lay the foundations. Whether we admit it or not, whether we like it or not, the cessation of nuclear tests is the basis and a prerequisite for any progress in the various aspects of general disarmament. Until we ~~have~~ examined here the various methods and suggestions put forward with a view to rescuing the nuclear Powers from the deadlock in which they find themselves regarding the burning problem of tests, I do not think that we should leave the subject nor postpone it, still less pretend to believe that we can solve other problems of disarmament by fitting window frames into the air while remaining deaf to the din of the armaments race, and while the gangrene of the nuclear weapon continues to poison the body and the spirit of mankind.

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Mr. Barrington, representative of Burma, expressed himself on this subject as follows:

"From time to time it has been suggested that the Conference, in view of the difficulties which immediately attend current discussion of the cessation of nuclear testing, should set it aside for the time being and pass on to the discussion of some other subject. Alternatively it is suggested that it might continue to be discussed, but in parallel with one or more other topics. My delegation is strongly opposed to any such course of action. As we had occasion to say before, we do not underrate the importance of general and complete disarmament or of the collateral measures. We believe they must be tackled and solved before mankind can be relieved of the dread of nuclear annihilation. But first things come first. And the cessation of nuclear tests comes first ...."

(ENDC/PV.105, p.10)

•He added:

"No amount of explanation would convince the world that we were not running away from our responsibilities if we turned to something else at this stage." (ibid.)

Mr. Foster, representative of the United States, said:

"Turning now to the procedures of our Conference in discussing the nuclear weapons test ban question we continue to believe that, as has been stated by the delegations of Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, as well as by our allies, first priority should be placed on the negotiation of a nuclear test ban." (ENDC/PV.104, p.21)

Mr. Kuznetsov, representative of the Soviet Union, said:

"In the statements of all representatives in the Committee, great attention has been paid to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests."

(ENDC/PV.101, p.34)

Mrs. Myrdal, representative of Sweden, said:

"My delegation also fully endorses the view that the Conference must concentrate its immediate efforts on the test ban issue." (ENDC/PV.100, p.23)

Mr. Lall, representative of India, spoke as follows:

"We are here to achieve agreements on general and complete disarmament. That is the mandate given to us by the United Nations General Assembly. But there is a logic of events; and the logic of events at this moment is such that it gives a clear priority to the question of a test ban."

(ibid., p.10)

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Mr. Imru, representative of Ethiopia, spoke as follows:

"It [the Ethiopian delegation] associates itself with the determination, widely expressed, to make headway in the task entrusted to this Committee: first, by solving the remaining problems that divide the nuclear Powers on the question of a test ban treaty;" (ibid., p.20)

Mr. de Melo Franco, representative of Brazil, said:

"Even had we desired to give priority in our discussions to other important problems, it would have been difficult for the Conference to direct its interest temporarily from the question of tests, for as the proverb says, 'If you pitch Nature out through the window, it comes back through the door'" (ENDC/FV.103, p. 9)

Mr. Mbu, representative of Nigeria, said:

"My delegation has at all times maintained that it is pointless talking about disarmament unless an effective stop is put to the perfection of these diabolical weapons of mass annihilation and naked aggression against humanity." (ENDC/FV.93, p.31)

Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic, said:

"I feel it my duty, however, to state frankly that our study of disarmament problems, in the absence of the long-cherished and now feasible test ban agreement, or at least in the absence of favourable signs for its solution, will remain, to say the least, largely academic." (ENDC/FV.99, p.17)

Sir Paul Mason, the United Kingdom representative, said:

"... it is of course a fact that the test ban remains our immediate concern:" (ENDC/FV.106, p.12)

Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy, said:

"I too am convinced that, if we do not make progress towards the solution of the problem of tests, our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament also may become futile." (ibid., p.5)

Mr. Tarabanov, representative of Bulgaria, said:

"... it should not be forgotten that the success of our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests will also determine to a great extent the progress

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which the Conference will be able to make on the most important problem of our time, general and complete disarmament, the solution of which is still its main task." (ENDC/FV.105, p.40)

I agree with all those who maintain that priority must be given to the conclusion of an agreement to cease nuclear tests. This is not pure rhetoric; it is not the problem itself which has priority, but its solution.

We are aware that it is possible to say that, by prolonging this debate interminably in plenary session, we are thereby keeping the problem in the forefront of the political scene and in the public eye. It is true that this is what the gravity and urgency of the problem demand. We trust that this debate will have an end, but that the end will be what we all anxiously hope for: the conclusion of a valid and effective treaty. We do not want the debate to end in deadlock or to be relegated to the background, behind the scenes. We still have hope, for in the words of Mr. Melo Franco we believe that ---

"If we give up hope, what is the use of our presence here?" (ENDC/FV.103, p. 15)

I should like to repeat what I said at the meeting of 12 February last:

"Our presence here is an act of faith in negotiation and in the rich results which are within reach of the perseverance and sincerity which we all bring to it. We are here because we are not discouraged by difficulties, nor intimidated by obstacles and because there is no weakening of our will to unite our efforts to achieve the aim to which we are committed: an effective agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapon tests and halt the armaments race, as the first essential steps to make thermonuclear war impossible and to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/FV.96, p. 5)

It has been said at an informal meeting that, if a treaty is not concluded by next spring, it will not be concluded for a long time to come. We have heard the reply to this statement: that it is not possible to fix a deadline, and that if a treaty is not concluded now, it will still be possible to do so at some future date, but that we must not abandon our efforts to conclude one. That is true enough. We must not abandon our efforts to conclude a treaty. Nevertheless,



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this reply prompts a query: What do the nuclear Powers propose to do in the intervening period, which could be one year, two years or more? Will they abstain from further tests, or will they continue their tests in the four environments? If what is meant is that the nuclear Powers have time to wait for an agreement, however long that may be, the answer is that the world cannot wait so long, especially if the intervening period is to be used for explosions contaminating the atmosphere and harming present and future generations.

Much has been said about the deterrent factor, about the effectiveness of control, and about the guarantees which the treaty should contain to ensure its due observance. We should like to ask what deterrent factor there can be in the absence of an agreement. How can there be effective control if there is no agreement and hence no control? What is the best way of ensuring implementation of the treaty? I should like to repeat what I said at our meeting on 9 May 1962:

"Any treaty freely concluded between sovereign States is based on the assumption that it will be faithfully observed. No State voluntarily signs and ratifies a treaty with the deliberate intention of violating it; but it is natural that the parties to a treaty should accept its obligations only after taking all possible political and legal precautions against its violation or evasion. It must nevertheless be recognized, however, that there is no possible provision whose inclusion in a treaty can provide an absolute guarantee of its observance. In the last analysis the essential, and the strongest, safeguard for the parties is submission to the rule of international law and ethics and respect for the pledged word." (ENDC/PV.34, p.17)

The stricter we require inspection to be, the more it will elude our grasp. The stricter we try to make control, the less control there will be. It has been said that to accept a small number of inspections entails the risk that clandestine explosions will take place without any possibility of identifying them. It has also been said that to accept a larger number of inspections entails the risk of espionage. But, if there is no agreement, a much greater risk is run both by the two parties and by the whole world, as a result of the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

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We should ask ourselves whether the concept of the most efficient control technique and the fear that inspection will constitute a risk to national security may not paradoxically act as a deterrent, not to the violation of the treaty, but to the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty itself. The sole proof and demonstration that the nuclear Powers want an agreement is the conclusion of an agreement. It is no use for one speaker or another to state who in his view is flexible or inflexible, or that one attitude is rigid and constitutes an ultimatum whereas another does not.

No Power, nuclear or not, believes or hopes that one side will accept the opposite point of view as a whole. The easiest way of preventing agreement is to stand on the positions which were adopted when this Committee resumed work for the fourth time. There is no need to discuss whether the positions of one side or the other represent a retreat to former positions or are in fact new positions. The important point is that these are the positions which are held at the present moment, and they should be considered in relation, not to the past or to the history of the negotiations, but to their intrinsic value, their significance in the present situation and their influence on the future. Can they or can they not be used as a point of departure for an agreement? That is the important point.

Public opinion must surely realize that a deadlock cannot be justified by either side. The reasons given for this state of affairs are trivial when viewed against the extreme gravity of the alternative. If there is a fear of clandestine underground explosions, which of their very nature must be of small magnitude and probably of doubtful military value, not affecting the existing balance, is there not far more reason to fear the explosions which in the absence of an agreement would be carried out in the four environments by the nuclear Powers? The subsequent proliferation of these weapons would inevitably accentuate the struggle between national interests and conflicting policies, based on a conception of sovereignty and self-protection which would be more clearly and more proudly proclaimed as time went on and would be independent of the control of the other Powers.

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As a result of continued tests, nuclear weapons might also be transformed into conventional arms. The perfecting of weapons does not increase the security of any Power. The sure and inevitable result would be to increase international tension, which in its turn would increase general insecurity. As long as there is no agreement to ban underground explosions, the door will remain open for the dangerous resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, which all peoples condemn as immoral, unjust and contrary to the highest interests and rights of humanity. The essential function of an agreement is to respect these rights and to avoid immeasurable evils.

Another important aspect of an agreement to cease tests is the impact it would have on international affairs. It would increase confidence, facilitate progress in the field of general disarmament, and create a climate less conducive to international crises, thereby making it possible either to avoid these or to settle them when they arise. Public opinion cannot understand how a controversy over the number and nature of inspections can be an obstacle to a settlement which would be such an important factor in the prevention of war. It is incomprehensible that the small risk entailed in the conclusion of an agreement not fully satisfactory to either side should prevail over the formidable risk of continuing a nuclear tests race on a vast scale.

There is also the fear that failure to agree may strengthen the belief that the nuclear Powers harbour undeclared intentions to continue tests. What causes alarm for the future is that the Powers have still failed to come to an agreement; and if, as many believe, the Powers do not want an agreement, this lack of good will is the sign of a more serious breakdown and is evidence of an evil, an error, or some flaw which goes even deeper. The absence of the wish to agree would demonstrate to us and to the world a fundamental incapacity for permanent peaceful relations. We do not believe that this is the case, and we are confident that our efforts will bear fruit. Progress in our deliberations is therefore indispensable, if only to encourage us to persevere and to justify our presence here. If no agreement on tests is reached, we may see plans stepped up for increasing armaments, in which case it would be illogical, contradictory and unrealistic to speak of disarmament when the Committee's essential objective is ignored.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

Collateral measures of disarmament are to a certain extent interdependent, and progress with these depends also on the prohibition of tests. All measures for avoiding war by accident, the creation of denuclearized zones, the peaceful use of outer space, the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, can only be realized in a climate of greater confidence created by an agreement to cease tests. Public opinion in all countries and in all international bodies has expressed with increasing insistence and concern its desire and hope that the great Powers will cease testing nuclear weapons in perpetuity. The time has come to listen to the cry for peace of all humanity and to act accordingly.

In this matter the small Powers speak to the great Powers with a single voice. Mr. Burns, representative of Canada, made the following statement:

"After listening to the debates at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and having spoken to many representatives who participated, the Canadian delegation believes that the practically unanimous opinion is that the stopping of nuclear tests is the first question relating to disarmament which has to be solved." (ENDC/PV.85, p.13)

When will heed be given to the General Assembly and the non-nuclear nations in this matter? The existence of small nations is a living and omnipresent reality; the existence of the United Nations is a fact whose influence in international life is undeniable and which cannot and must not be underestimated. The sooner this reality is recognized and the views and feelings of small nations and of the General Assembly are taken into account, the sooner will the Powers be in a position to extricate themselves from the armaments race and from the dangers of possible nuclear conflict.

We eight additional countries in the Disarmament Committee did not seek to come here, but here we are, and as long as the need and desire to negotiate keep this Committee alive, we shall be here, either those of us who are here now or other States of equal merit and ability. That, however, will always be in virtue of the same mandate from the world community: to help the great Powers to reach agreement, since agreement is the only alternative to total destruction, and the peaceful solution of international issues is the only way of avoiding war and the only way which leads to peace.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

Nevertheless, I believe that the eight countries represented here which do not form part of either of the opposing military alliances wish to play a more useful role than that of spectators of rivalries and differences. We have a deep and sincere desire to make progress in our tasks and to fulfil it by an agreement.

However modest -- and I am speaking for my own delegation -- the suggestions which we have made or may make in the future, we wish them to be given serious consideration, to be referred back to the governments concerned, and to be discussed in plenary session, since all these suggestions are made with the intention and the hope of offering the great Powers honourable means -- which we believe to be just and politically equitable -- of resolving the deadlock which obstructs progress in the negotiations and prevents agreement.

The small nations represented here and in the General Assembly have made concrete suggestions and recommendations which the nuclear Powers have not discussed here and about which they have expressed no views. I refer to paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII), and to the suggestions contained in Addendum II of the report which our Committee submitted to the General Assembly on 7 December 1962 (ENDC/68).

It is unnecessary to repeat that, in regard to the prohibition of nuclear tests, we all desire a comprehensive final treaty which will prohibit all tests in all environments -- underground, under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space. Nevertheless, the General Assembly in resolution 1762 (XVII), paragraph 6, made the following recommendation:

"... that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum<sup>1/</sup> and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission;" (ENDC/63, p.3).

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

Why have the nuclear Powers ignored this possibility? Why has no attention been paid so far to the suggestions of the eight delegations (ENDC/68) regarding that recommendation of the General Assembly?

I shall mention only the names of those delegations which gave their support to this recommendation of the General Assembly. In order not to prolong my statement, I shall not quote each of the statements in this document which were submitted by the representatives of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic. I shall quote only the statement of the representative of Sweden.

That representative suggested that:

"The international scientific commission, as proposed in the 8-Power memorandum, should be set up immediately, on an interim basis, without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a comprehensive agreement."

He suggested further ---

"A time-limited suspension of underground tests while the details of a comprehensive test ban treaty were worked out. During this period the interim commission should fulfil the functions with regard to detection and identification of seismic events as laid down in the UN resolution 1762(XVII)A paragraph 6." He added that ---

"Such a provisional arrangement with regard to underground tests should make it possible for the nuclear Powers immediately to enter into a final agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water." (ibid., p.10)

I reaffirm our conviction that it is essential to conclude a permanent and comprehensive treaty; but we also believe that if, contrary to all hope and despite all our efforts, a definite treaty is not concluded for the time being, then we must have --- as requested by the General Assembly --- a provisional agreement to suspend underground tests, which will permit of a prohibition of tests in the other three environments where no international control is required, since the national means are sufficient to identify explosions.

On 30 November last year I made the following statement:

"With regard to operative paragraph 6 [of resolution 1762 A(XVII)]7, I believe it is essential to ascertain the interpretation placed on it by the nuclear Powers, and the opinion thereon of the other members of this Committee.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

Other speakers have already quoted the text of operative paragraph 6, and I need not read it again. I should like, however, to ask whether the Powers are prepared to enter into a provisional or interim arrangement suspending all underground tests as a supplement to an agreement to prohibit testing in the three environments in which international inspection is not necessary. What are the views of the Powers concerned on the adequate assurances which such a provisional agreement should contain regarding the effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission?" (ENDC/PV.85, pp. 34,35).

We know the opinion of the Assembly and the views expressed by the delegations which I have mentioned. Why do the nuclear Powers not explore this possibility and express their own views on the subject? This was the path indicated by the General Assembly itself. The great Powers, which are so jealous of their national security and their prestige, have the opportunity of showing the world that they really want to suspend tests and at the same time that they take into account the views of all the small nations.

The provisional agreement referred to in the resolution would not be an uncontrolled moratorium, as the principle of on-site inspection has been accepted; and that would enable us to set in motion the complicated machinery of the international scientific commission proposed in the memorandum (ENDC/28). We should at the same time be able to acquire experience which, coupled maybe with further developments in science and technology, would provide us with a firm basis for a definite agreement to prohibit underground nuclear weapons tests.

Possibly, while discussing the conditions for a provisional agreement which could be tried out for a specified period (a year, for example, or longer), the Powers would be able to agree more easily on the number of inspections and on the modalities and criteria which would be applied during the period of the provisional agreement and would be a valuable source of experience of the effective practical operation of international supervision.

I believe that all possible ways should be explored. Any road which brought us closer to our aims would be a good road. If we cannot achieve the best in a short time -- that is, a comprehensive and definite treaty -- let us explore the possibilities of a provisional agreement such as is recommended by the General Assembly. Let us build a bridge between the present deadlock and the perfect treaty.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

Perhaps such exploration will give us some guidance which will enable us to come to a correct understanding of the causes which prevent the conclusion of an agreement.

It is difficult to judge and to find a solution for problems which may or may not be the true ones. We must know what are the real rather than the ostensible obstacles. We have heard what the representatives of the nuclear Powers have to say, but perhaps we do not know what they think. Maybe everyone believes that the true obstacles are fear of espionage and fear of fraud. If anyone believes that the obstacles to an agreement are the desire or the need of each side to continue nuclear tests in order not to retard progress in this field, and with the idea of gaining a military advantage over the other side, we do not agree with him. The quest for the ultimate weapon and for permanent nuclear superiority is false and illusory, and the chief danger of trifling with falsehood is that one may end by believing in it.

We believe that the nuclear Powers wish and know that an end should be put as soon as possible to the nuclear arms race. We also believe that both sides desire with equal sincerity to overcome the obstacles which still stand in the way of their taking the final step towards agreement. We all want to co-operate with them so as to achieve this aim. We have an important mission to fulfil, one which is difficult and entails great responsibility. My delegation has devoted and will continue to devote its efforts to this end with all perseverance.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): First of all I should like to make a brief comment on the statement made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo. We shall study this statement carefully, but I should like to say the following straight away. In his statement this morning, a statement full of sincere concern for the fate of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, the representative of Mexico has shown most cogently how necessary an agreement is and how ripe are all the conditions for an immediate agreement on this question.



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We fully share this point of view and the concern which Mr. Padilla Nervo has expressed. We consider that the Committee already has everything required for the conclusion of an agreement, but this is prevented by the persistent attempts of the United States to wring from the Soviet Union new concessions in regard to the number of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations, and by the stubborn unwillingness of the United States to come to an agreement in accordance with the proposed compromise conditions on the quota of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations. As soon as the United States waives its excessive demands and adopts a moderate and reasonable attitude which will enable us to agree on a quota of two to three inspections and on the number of automatic seismic stations we have proposed, all obstacles will disappear and the way to an agreement will be open. It is therefore up to the United States.

Now I wish to state the Soviet delegation's views on certain aspects of the Committee's work. At our last meeting the co-Chairmen submitted recommendations regarding the further procedure for the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/FV.108, p.34). In order to agree on those rather limited recommendations, quite a number of talks were required. We shall not deal with the recommendations regarding the procedure for discussing the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and the question of general and complete disarmament. The procedure for the discussion of these questions has already been settled. We should like to dwell on the question why it has not been possible to reach agreement on the questions which the Committee of the Whole should proceed to consider immediately. It is necessary to do so, if only because at our last meeting a number of delegations expressed their justified concern at the lack of agreement between the co-Chairmen in this important field of our work.

The Soviet delegation, far from objecting, considered it necessary that on resuming its work the Committee should give its attention primarily to the question of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. In doing so we were guided by the fact that, thanks to the initiative of the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, favourable conditions have been brought about for speedily resolving the remaining differences and concluding an agreement which would put an end to all nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the Western Powers did not display due understanding of the Soviet Union's goodwill; they did not appreciate the steps taken by us to meet the United States, and, instead

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of coming to an agreement with us, they began to pile up new obstacles, putting forward demands for a greater number of inspections and of automatic seismic stations on the territory of the Soviet Union. It is precisely for this reason that, in spite of the fact that the Committee has now been in session for over a month since resuming its work, there is as yet no likelihood of agreement being reached.

But the question of stopping tests is not the only task before our Committee. There are other very important questions which the Committee has to consider and solve. There are no reasons why the Committee should continue to put off the discussion of the other important questions before us. If we were to take that course, it would in fact be tantamount to winding up all useful work of the Committee, and the Committee would testify to its incapacity to fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is for this reason that, while not refusing to continue its efforts towards solving the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet delegation deemed it necessary to raise the question that we should also take up other matters before the Committee.

The drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament has been and still is the Committee's main task. We can only express the hope that, now that we have agreed on the Committee's procedure of work, the Committee will deal in earnest with this question, namely general and complete disarmament. At the same time it must be recognized that, in the present international situation, the achievement of agreement on measures aimed at relaxing international tension and eliminating the danger of war acquires particular significance and therefore particular urgency.

The crisis in the area of the Caribbean, which in the autumn of last year brought the world to the brink of a thermo-nuclear war, emphasized with exceptional force the imperative need for the immediate adoption of measures aimed at easing international tension and creating conditions which would preclude the possibility of a military conflict breaking out between States.

Those members of our Committee who took part in the work of the United Nations General Assembly will no doubt remember the attention which was devoted in the statements made by the great majority, if not all, of the delegates to the idea that it was extremely necessary to reach agreement on such measures. This was mentioned by delegates belonging to various camps, the representatives of countries which are members of military blocs and of countries which are not. Those views were reflected in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, which is the guiding principle for

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the work of our Committee. General Assembly resolution 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962 recommends to the Eighteen-Nation Committee "that urgent attention should be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament;" (ENDC/64). The Eighteen-Nation Committee cannot ignore this General Assembly resolution. It is under obligation to report by a fixed date -- not later than the second week of April -- on the progress of its work in preparing such measures.

Finally, it may also be recalled that, when the Committee resumed its work, many of its members -- the representatives of Poland, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, Bulgaria, India, Romania, Nigeria and others -- insistently emphasized that the Committee should not delay agreement on so-called collateral measures but, on the contrary, that it was obliged to give them the greatest possible attention.

The main danger in the world today is the danger of a nuclear war. This is greatly increased by the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territory. The removal of the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons from foreign territory would be tantamount to taking the first and at the same time extremely important steps towards eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and towards easing the whole international situation.

It is hardly necessary to say that the trend of international events and the fate of the world at the present time depend to a crucial extent on the relations between the two largest groupings of States -- the States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. It is precisely these two groupings which possess the most powerful armed forces and the most advanced types of weapons. How international life will develop, whether matters will tend towards the consolidation of peace or, on the contrary, towards a deterioration of the international situation, and ultimately towards a military catastrophe, depends first and foremost on the relations between those States. That is a realistic fact, and those who take their stand on a realistic policy should take it into account. The study of these problems should be our starting-point, and that is where we should begin if we wish to achieve positive results in improving the whole of international life. If we in this Committee

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were to succeed in preparing the ground for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, that would be a great service rendered by the Committee, a real and very important contribution to the consolidation of peace.

Taking all this into consideration, the head of the Soviet delegation, in conversations with the head of the United States delegation, proposed as co-Chairman of the Eighteen-Nation Committee that the Committee should discuss the draft Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and the draft Non-aggression Pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77). We proposed that these should be discussed in plenary meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Apart from considerations regarding the extreme importance of these proposals, we assumed that their discussion in plenary meetings would enable us to avoid a superfluous and unnecessary stage. We considered, and still consider, that it would be quite possible to discuss these questions in plenary meetings, to take positive decisions on them, and to set about implementing them immediately.

The United States delegation objected to that procedure, although we heard no valid arguments on its part. In order not to delay the consideration of the measures we proposed, the Soviet delegation decided on a compromise and agreed that the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the draft Non-aggression Pact should be discussed first in the Committee of the Whole. The United States delegation agreed that the question of the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be included in the agenda of the Committee of the Whole.

We expected that the United States delegation would not object to discussion in the Committee of the Whole of the draft Non-aggression Pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries submitted by the Soviet Union. The objection of the United States delegation to the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the Committee of the Whole was to us all the more unexpected as the head of the United States delegation, Mr. Foster, had said on 20 February:

"Certainly there is no objection on the part of the United States to such such discussions in that proper frame of reference. Nonetheless, I shall

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of course report to my Government the submission of this draft, and we shall have comments to make on it later." (ENDC/PV.100, p.50)

This statement by Mr. Foster showed that the United States Government had no objection in principle to the draft non-aggression pact being discussed. Furthermore, there was a clear indication that the United States side intended to make its comments on the Soviet draft pact. We propose that this question be discussed in the Committee of the Whole, which is where, under our agreed procedure of work, such measures should be discussed.

To our surprise, when we raised this question at a meeting of the two co-Chairmen the United States side, contrary to its earlier statements, adopted a position which in fact obstructed discussion of a non-aggression pact in the Committee. At present there is no question of giving the item concerning a non-aggression pact, let us say, the first place on the Committee's agenda, although it fully deserves it, and I know for certain that many delegations here present would like the non-aggression pact to be discussed as a matter of priority. It would appear that the United States side is anxious to prevent altogether discussion of the draft non-aggression pact in any predictable future.

How did our United States colleagues explain this very strange and incomprehensible position of theirs on this question?

When the Soviet delegation submitted the draft non-aggression pact for the consideration of the Committee on 20 February 1963, no valid objections to the discussion of this question in the Committee were put forward. On the contrary, in the general debate which followed, many of the delegations pointed out in their statements that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the leading groups of States -- the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries -- would be a useful contribution to the cause of peace. Thus, for instance, the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Melo Franco, said that a non-aggression pact between the two military groups deserved "the immediate and explicit support of the Brazilian delegation" (ENDC/PV.98, p.19). The great importance of the conclusion of such a pact for the easing of international tension was also pointed out by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbu, in his statement (ibid., p.30).

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But it was not only the representatives of socialist and non-aligned countries who advocated discussion of this problem. Even the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on 20 February 1963, pointed out that the question of a pact "is, of course, already on the agenda for consideration in the Committee of the Whole, and I think that is probably the appropriate place in which it should be considered" (ENDC/PV.100, p.44). I hope that the United Kingdom delegation has not changed its opinion and that this statement remains valid.

The only exception was the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster. He said that the United States was "not enthusiastic" about the question of concluding a non-aggression pact being discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ibid., p.50). The United States representative explained his position with the same lack of enthusiasm also at a meeting of the co-Chairmen. In explaining his remark, Mr. Foster was only able to adduce arguments which were not very convincing. He pointed out that most of the countries members of NATO were not represented in the Committee. He also said that "at this table there are a number of countries which have no part in the European alliances" (ibid.) -- that is, the non-aligned States.

Even at that time these objections called forth justified objections from the Soviet Union delegation. Indeed, how can one put forward as a reason for refusing to discuss the question of concluding a non-aggression pact the argument that not all NATO members are represented in the Committee? If we were to follow this logic, we should not be able to discuss in this Committee a single question, even general and complete disarmament, since every question affects dozens of countries which are not represented in this Committee. Yet the United States delegation, it seems, has not yet told us once that the non-participation of some particular State in the work of the Committee prevents us from discussing, say, such a problem as that of reducing the risk of war by accident. So what do we get? In one case the United States delegation adheres to one principle, and in another -- when for some reason it thinks this is to its advantage -- it lightheartedly rejects the same principle. Such "flexibility" can hardly be of any assistance to the Committee's work.

(Mr. Tarabin, USSR)

Even more peculiar is another assertion of the United States representative, to the effect that it would be undesirable to discuss the question of a pact in the Eighteen-Nation Committee since non-aligned States having no part in either NATO or the Warsaw Treaty are represented in the Committee. If this argument is advanced by the United States delegation after thorough reflection, its peculiar trend should put us very much on our guard. This argument of the United States seems to indicate that the United States would like to keep the non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America away from participating in the discussion of important problems of international life and to prevent them from taking part in the solution of cardinal international problems. This tendency --- which, incidentally, also appears in the Western Powers' constant intention to transfer to the Three-Power Sub-Committee the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests --- has always been characteristic of the NATO Powers, and only opposition on the part of the Soviet Union and the socialist States has prevented those plans from being carried out.

We believe that precisely the presence of non-aligned States in these negotiations is a favourable factor which can help towards a positive solution of the most important international problems, including the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. Statements of representatives of the non-aligned States here, in the Committee, provide convincing evidence of their profound interest in the discussion of such a pact, since it naturally affects not only the members of the military groupings. It would help create an atmosphere of confidence throughout the world and to avert a general war.

Some other objections have been expressed, it is true, not by the United States delegation, but by one of its allies. Thus on 25 February Mr. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy, put forward the following view:

"If NATO were inherently as aggressive as Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Tarabanov asserted last Wednesday, would it not be rather naive to propose a non-aggression pact?" (ENDC/PV.101, pp.7,8)

That was the question put by Mr. Cavalletti. Then he asked:

"Can the leopard change his spots, and would there not be a danger that in signing a non-aggression pact we should simply be a wolf in sheep's clothing?" (ibid., p.8)

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Mr. Cavalletti went on to say:

"... it [the Soviet Union] already knows that the Western countries have no aggressive designs against anyone, and that they place the desire for peace with security above everything else?" (ibid.)

Oh, how ingenious the representative of Italy is! The meaning of his statement is that, if we consider NATO an aggressive bloc, then there is no sense in concluding a non-aggression pact with this bloc; it would be naive. If, however, we are disposed to believe the statements of the members of NATO that this bloc is a harmless, peaceful-minded, purely defensive organization, in that case also a non-aggression pact is unnecessary! There you have the philosophy of Mr. Cavalletti.

Having listened to the representative of Italy, one can only marvel that people still fail to realize that a non-aggression pact is in principle a senseless and unnecessary thing. After all, that is the only conclusion one can come to after listening to Mr. Cavalletti's arguments. According to his reasoning, it turns out that a pact with a potential aggressor is unnecessary, and a pact is equally unnecessary with a non-aggressor. When, then, is a non-aggression pact necessary?

Yes, Mr. Cavalletti: ~~we~~ -- and not only we -- consider that the NATO bloc is an aggressive bloc, and there is ample proof of this. We have already adduced it on several occasions, and therefore we shall not repeat it. But we believe that international treaties and agreements have a definite force and a definite significance, even though they are in fact often violated. Their significance is that they strengthen the position of those forces which stand for peace against aggression and against war. International public opinion, public opinion in any country, today represents a force which must be taken into account; and this force is entirely in favour of maintenance of peace. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact would be a very important contribution to the consolidation of peace. Such a pact would to a certain extent restrain aggressive forces and tendencies, and would in the long run play an important role in averting clashes between the countries parties to it.

No doubts about the usefulness of such a non-aggression pact can arise among those who are not contemplating any aggressive action. On the other hand, such a



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pact arouses apprehension and animosity among those who fear the creation of obstacles to the realization of their aggressive plans.

Apparently realizing the weakness of his arguments, the representative of the United States alleged that the proposed non-aggression pact did not actually bear on disarmament but might raise questions "with regard to the political and security arrangements of Western Europe" (ENDC/PV.100, p.50).

The representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, has already pointed out the extreme weakness and utterly unconvincing nature of these arguments of the United States representative. It is true that a number of measures on the agenda of the Committee of the Whole, including measures proposed by the Western Powers, do not bear directly on disarmament. However, the collateral measures recommended by the Soviet Union have a definite relationship to our basic task --- the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. When these measures are carried out they will considerably lessen the danger of war and thus create favourable conditions for the conclusion of such a treaty. The General Assembly of the United Nations has entrusted the Committee with the discussion of such measures, and up till now, apparently, the United States has not considered such discussion to be outside the functions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In his last argument the representative of the United States deals, strictly speaking, with the substance of the matter and not with procedure, and we reserve the right to answer him later on when we come to discuss the question of a pact. For the time being we should merely like to say that in putting forward this argument the representative of the United States contradicts the President of his own country, who, as we know, in a letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union dated 27 October 1962, expressed his willingness to discuss the question of reducing international tension in the relations between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, and to consider any useful proposals on that subject. The President of the United States apparently did not think that the consideration of such questions could in any way affect the security of the Western countries. In this case it is impossible not to agree with him. Indeed, nothing could strengthen the security of any State more than the conclusion of a non-aggression pact --- a pact

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which would reduce tension in those areas of the world most threatened with the possibility of war.

The need to achieve agreement on such a pact is becoming more and more obvious and insistent every day. During the past months we have witnessed new and feverish military preparations on the part of the NATO countries. These preparations have now assumed a very dangerous nature: there is taking place at a precipitate rate the arming of West Germany, in which the same forces which led to the unleashing of the Second World War are now active. While we here in this Committee are talking of disarmament and peace, in the West new military alliances are being concluded, nuclear armaments are being improved, and Western Germany is being given access to the means for waging a nuclear missile war. That is what the agreement concluded at Nassau a few months ago is aimed at.

At the very beginning of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the Soviet delegation pointed out the extreme danger inherent in the measures provided for in this agreement. We were assured at the time that the purpose and meaning of the Nassau agreement was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and that there was no intention to arm German militarism with nuclear weapons. But what actually happened? It is now being said quite openly that, in order to legalize the transfer of nuclear weapons to Western Germany in the very near future, the United States will revise the McMahon Act, which forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries. The German Minister of War, von Hassel, makes no secret of the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany itself was the originator of the plan for the creation of a surface fleet equipped with Polaris missiles, just as no one makes any secret of the fact that the aim of the German initiative is to "join the nuclear club".

We are bound to be put on our guard also by the fact that in the Franco-German agreement, which provides for extensive military liaison between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, no room was found for a single word on disarmament or on the prevention of war. Instead, the talk at NATO headquarters now centres around the concept of a "forward movement" as a new military doctrine. This doctrine has a clearly-expressed aggressive character.

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This Committee has often heard the arguments of the United States delegation that all plans for the creation of a NATO multinational or multilateral nuclear force are motivated by one purpose only -- to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. In this connexion certain circles in the United States, apparently less restricted in their actions than the United States delegation, are expressing the view that the plans for the creation of a NATO multinational nuclear force stem from the desire of the United States to maintain its control, not only over nuclear weapons, but also over the governments of its NATO allies. But actually a process is going on which is the reverse of these assertions of the United States. There are already many facts which show that, instead of the United States Government, which is said to be anxious to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other forces are beginning to play first violin in the NATO nuclear ensemble.

In this regard the development of the question of a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force is bound to give rise to some concern. The plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force was born at Nassau, and its original authors set up a definite framework for this plan. Reference was made to submarines with Polaris missiles fitted with nuclear warheads. Then we learned that this plan did not suit the Bonn Government, because it did not enable Western Germany to be included in the NATO multilateral nuclear force immediately. In addition to a submarine nuclear fleet, the Bonn Government demanded that a NATO surface fleet equipped with nuclear missile weapons should be created at once. Why did the Bonn militarists want to introduce such changes into the United States plan? Because Western Germany possesses the necessary industrial means to construct surface vessels, but apparently does not yet possess the means to construct atomic submarines.

It is obvious that Western Germany is not disposed to be content with the role of a third-rate partner in the military alliance. It is striving to push Great Britain aside and become, if not equal to the United States, at least the second most important ally within NATO. It is being said openly in political circles in the Western countries that this is precisely why Western Germany has demanded that, instead of or in addition to submarine bases for nuclear missile weapons, a surface fleet of twenty-five ships with two hundred missiles fitted with nuclear warheads should be created. In order to achieve this aim, the militarist Government of

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Western Germany is prepared to extract as much money as possible out of the pockets of the German people and to spend the same amount as the United States on the creation of a nuclear fleet.

All this shows that the West German avengers, having already achieved their first successes in their claims to a leading role in the NATO multilateral nuclear force, are putting forward new demands. Chancellor Adenauer has already said that a NATO nuclear fleet is not the final solution to this question. "This", he stressed, "is only the beginning of the development". Adenauer has not yet shown all his cards, but he has stated frankly that he would like medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads -- that is, the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- to be located on German soil. These West German plans testify that the Bonn Government has openly taken the course towards a nuclear war and that it will not stop, of course, at the unleashing of one. The course of recent events convincingly shows that these plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral and multinational force, just like the French/West German military agreement, are playing into the hands of the most dangerous aggressive forces.

All these military preparations of the Western Powers are in sharp contrast to their unctuous speeches about peace in our Committee, and are contrary to the aims which the Eighteen-Nation Committee has been called upon to achieve. The armaments race and the feverish military preparations of the Western Powers are creating in Europe and throughout the world a situation fraught with possibilities of the outbreak at any moment of a conflict which could immediately turn into a general thermo-nuclear war. They are increasing international tension, aggravating relations between States, and thickening the cold-war atmosphere. Our task and duty is to adopt as soon as possible measures which will improve the international situation and relax the now tense relations between the States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries would provide a barrier against the development of events which might escape the control of those who initiated them, and would undermine the position of the forces of aggression. Would this not correspond to the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

task of our Committee and to the interests of all nations? The conclusion of a non-aggression pact is the true way to create confidence and encourage trust between States, and to create favourable conditions for the solution of the problems of disarmament.

We believe that the consideration of this question cannot be postponed any longer. In our opinion the question of a non-aggression pact should be discussed in the Committee of the Whole immediately after discussion of the question of the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means for the delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), and the question of war through accident (ENDC/70).

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation listened with interest to the highly constructive statement made this morning by the representative of Italy. We listened with great attention also to the eloquent statement of the representative of Mexico. We were impressed by, and we deeply appreciate, the earnest desire of the representative of Mexico for an early treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Listening to his statement I thought that the main thrust of it was a call for real and prompt negotiations on the issues that lie between the two sides in reaching an early agreement. That is the deep desire of the United States delegation, and we shall do everything in our power to achieve real negotiations, prompt negotiations, and successful negotiations.

I must take exception to one statement by our Soviet colleague made in a comment on the statement of the representative of Mexico. As I understand it, he said (supra, p.25 ) that the Committee now has before it everything necessary for the conclusion of an agreement. Unfortunately that is not quite an accurate statement. We have agreement in principle on the general framework of a verification system for a nuclear test ban treaty. We have Soviet proposals on numbers of inspections and on numbers of automatic stations. We have before us the United States proposals on arrangements or modalities for on-site inspections. We do not have such proposals, or comments on the United States proposals, from the Soviet Union. That is what we need to have before us, and that is what we need to assist us to proceed to prompt and real negotiations for an early treaty banning nuclear tests.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I should now like to speak upon procedure. I assure the representative of Mexico that the United States delegation also continues to want to give priority in our Conference to the consideration of a test ban treaty. It was for that purpose and to ensure what we believe is also desirable -- namely, that we should not lose sight of our main long-run objective in this Conference, general and complete disarmament -- that the United States delegation originally proposed (ENDC/PV.103, p.16) that the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban treaty should be reconvened; that it should of course report frequently to the plenary Conference; and that there should be plenary discussions as frequently as were desired upon a test ban treaty. We thought that the resumption of discussions by the three nuclear Powers in the Sub-Committee could mean that the Conference was in continuous negotiation on the test ban treaty in the Sub-Committee and in plenary meetings, as appropriate, but that at the same time it might allow some plenary meetings to be devoted, while the test ban Sub-Committee was in session, to consideration of the other important issues which face us and which we must not lose complete sight of -- that is, general and complete disarmament, and collateral measures.

As the Soviet representative has said (*supra*, p. 31), the Soviet delegation was not willing to resume meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee. Accordingly, while still giving priority to the test ban discussions, we agreed to the recommendation -- made by the co-Chairmen at our last meeting and adopted by the Committee (ENDC/PV.108, p. 40) -- of a procedure whereby one (the first) plenary meeting each week, and possibly another plenary meeting each week, should be devoted to the test ban treaty, while one plenary meeting a week would normally be devoted to general and complete disarmament.

I should like now to speak on the procedures of the Committee of the Whole. The Soviet representative said that the United States delegation gave no reason why it believed that the collateral measures which had been proposed in the Conference, by whatever delegation, should be discussed in the Committee of the Whole rather than in plenary meetings. We think the reasons are obvious, and in fact we did give them to our Soviet colleague.

The plenary meetings on general and complete disarmament have an agreed agenda (ENDC/52). We thought that the Committee of the Whole, which was devised for discussion of collateral measures, was the logical place in which to discuss collateral measures, and that an agenda for that Committee could be devised which would then not interfere

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

with the agenda already agreed on for discussion of general and complete disarmament in plenary meetings. The argument does not need to be laboured, because the Soviet delegation has agreed that discussion of collateral measures should proceed in the Committee of the Whole.

In his discussion of the agenda for the Committee of the Whole the Soviet representative took the occasion, while discussing procedure, to launch into a long, violent and, I submit, irrelevant diatribe against the Nassau agreement and against defensive arrangements being considered by NATO, and he coupled that with unwarranted attacks upon the peaceful people and Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. I do not propose to follow our Soviet colleague in drawing the attention of the Conference away from the work at hand. We are discussing today the procedures for the Committee of the Whole, and I propose to discuss that question.

The United States delegation believes it is highly unfortunate that it has so far proved impossible to reach an agreement with our Soviet co-Chairmen on the resumption of discussion of collateral measures in the Committee of the Whole. We believe that important progress might result from such discussion. Specifically we believe that measures to reduce the risk of war through accident or failure of communications are important and ripe for early agreement.

I should like to explain quite briefly the procedural differences that have so far blocked agreement on the resumption of discussion in the Committee of the Whole. The United States proposed that the co-Chairmen should recommend at this time the resumption of discussion in the Committee of the Whole on the basis of the previous arrangement that we had for discussion in the Committee of the Whole -- that is, parallel discussion of one Soviet item and one United States item. We were prepared to agree to discussion of the topic proposed by the United States -- the reduction of the possibility of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications (ENDC/70) -- and either one of the Soviet items, the declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), or the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe (ENDC/C.1/1).

The Soviet co-Chairman agreed, as he said today, that the risk-of-war item and the declaration on foreign territories should be paired as the first items for discussion. However, he refused to agree to such discussion unless we would commit ourselves in advance to debating the Soviet proposal on a non-aggression pact between

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States (ENDC/77) immediately after the conclusion of a debate on the first pair of items. The United States believes that, because of the Conference's present heavy schedule of work in connexion with the test ban question and general and complete disarmament, there is no need at this time to agree upon subsequent measures for consideration in the Committee of the Whole. It has been our practice in the past to agree upon two items to be discussed as a pair without agreement on further items. We believe that, given other matters with which the Conference is occupied, it would be some time before we could hope to complete consideration of those first two items in the Committee of the Whole.

We were not prepared to accept the Soviet proposal that we should agree to give priority on the agenda to yet another Soviet item in addition to the declaration on strategic vehicles, along with the one United States item on risk of war measures. I think we should recall briefly a little of the history of the discussion on priority for items in the Committee of the Whole. The Committee will recall that originally there was difficulty in arriving at agreement on even the first item that we should discuss in the Committee of the Whole. That difficulty arose from Soviet unwillingness to accept for discussion any one of the three items which the United States had put forward for discussion in the Committee of the Whole. I refer to the three items listed in the right-hand column of the document which is familiar to all representatives -- document ENDC/C.1/2 of 2 April 1962.

In order to get the work of the Committee of the Whole under way the United States agreed that discussions should begin with an item proposed by the Soviet delegation, and we placed on the agenda of the Committee of the Whole for priority discussion the subject of the cessation of war propaganda. I do not need to recall the unhappy history of the discussion on that item. Following that discussion we agreed to give priority concurrently to two items -- one was an item proposed for priority discussion by the Soviet Union, namely, the item on measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The other item was in fact one-half of an original item proposed for discussion by the United States. It will be recalled that we had proposed discussion on the reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications. That item the Soviet delegation refused to discuss, but finally it agreed to discuss in pair with its own item the item on the reduction of the possibility of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.



(Mr. Stelle, United States)

For reasons which seemed cogent to both the co-Chairmen, we have since set aside temporarily discussion on the question of the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear weapons. But, so far, with paired items for our next discussion -- namely, the risk of war and the Soviet draft declaration -- the ratio of items would be one Soviet item, which we discussed originally, and a further Soviet item, to one-half of a United States item. The ratio of items discussed in the Committee of the Whole would therefore be two to one-half in favour of the Soviet delegation. The Soviet delegation has now proposed that we should add another Soviet item. That would result in a total of three Soviet items to one-half of a United States item. The inequality of such an arrangement is obvious, I believe. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its position so that the Committee of the Whole may resume its discussions.

We very much regret that the present stand of the Soviet delegation thus far prevents early resumption of the activities of the Committee of the Whole. We believe that very real accomplishments could be achieved at a very early date in connexion with measures to reduce the risk of war. In that area we have three topics which are common to both disarmament plans. The United States believes that we could make a beginning on those relatively simple measures without lengthy negotiations. Such agreement in the near future, we believe, could be a great stimulus to progress in the more complicated work of the Conference concerning general disarmament. Those early measures to reduce the risk of war are of very real significance in their own right. If, for example, we could agree upon and establish in the immediate future -- not at some distant date -- a more direct and secure communications link to begin with, let us say, between the Soviet Government and the United States Government, we should have brought into being an arrangement that would reduce immediately the danger of accidental war. Surely our philosophy here should be to make use of the areas of present agreement when they appear while we seek solutions to other and more difficult issues.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Gentlemen, my list has become considerably longer. The representatives of Poland, the United Kingdom and Italy have asked to speak. However, since it seems that they wish to make only brief remarks, I am prepared to call on them now although it is already late.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland)(translation from French): I cannot give you a definite promise to be brief. I shall do my best, but I wonder whether it would not be preferable to adjourn and to continue the debate on Monday, since it is already 1 p.m.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In the co-Chairmen's recommendations at our last meeting one very firm item was that the first meeting of each week should be devoted to the test ban question. In view, in particular, of the eloquent statement made today by the representative of Mexico, I should hesitate to subscribe to the immediate upsetting of that arrangement.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland)(translation from French): It does not seem to me that there is any contradiction between the proposal I have just made and what has been suggested by the co-Chairmen: that is to say, that Monday's meeting should be devoted to the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests. For example, we could begin our meeting on Monday by continuing the present debate, and then turn to the discussion of nuclear tests. In any case it seems to me that we should bring this debate on procedure to a rapid conclusion, since it is a sheer waste of time. If it had not taken so long, perhaps I should have been able to begin my statement already.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy)(translation from French): For my part, I am largely in agreement with what the Polish representative has just said. I should only like to emphasize that this should be a debate on procedure. I should not like us to embark on such a debate while some delegations, on the contrary, are initiating a discussion on the substance of the question and are making observations and remarks of the kind which Mr. Tsarapkin made once more this morning.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I wanted to speak only very briefly this morning. I note that our Polish colleague feels that he might delay our lunch considerably, and I welcome that element of flexibility in relation to the length of his speech, if not in relation to other matters. At any rate, if it be the wish of the Committee that we should not proceed longer this morning -- and I think in

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

general it is a good rule that we do not go on much beyond one o'clock — I should have thought that probably the better way, if the representative of Poland will forgive me, would be if both he and I were to deny ourselves the pleasure of speaking at the beginning of Monday's meeting.

We have, as our United States colleague has so rightly said, allocated Monday's meeting to the question of nuclear tests. Let us, then, continue the nuclear test ban discussion, which does not impinge on procedure. It could go on and, if there were time after speakers had finished their discussion of nuclear tests, we could revert to the procedural matters and have the pleasure of hearing the speech of the representative of Poland. If, however, the question of nuclear tests occupies the entire meeting, the logical step then would be to continue this discussion, which is clearly on another matter, at a subsequent meeting of the Committee. It seems to me that that would conform to the arrangement we have already made. It would not upset other plans, and would mean a continuation of this debate taking place probably on Wednesday. Possibly that might be the most convenient way of solving this question.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia)(translation from Russian): Does any other representative wish to speak on this question? Apparently no one. I do not know whether there have been any concrete proposals on this question, but I should like to submit for the Committee's consideration my personal opinion that, in view of the late hour, it would be preferable to adjourn now, and that on Monday we should begin with the question of the prohibition of tests, in accordance with the co-Chairmen's recommendation which we have adopted. If the list of speakers on that question is exhausted and we still have time, we shall be able to discuss questions of procedure. If not, we will deal with them on Wednesday.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and ninth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Kurka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Mexico, the Soviet Union, the United States, Poland and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 18 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.